Nicholas Blanford, Special to NOW Lebanon, August 30, 2007

No one knows when nor how the next confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel will begin, but there is near unanimity that another bought of violence will happen sometime in the future. That inevitability has compelled both Hezbollah and the Israeli army to begin taking preparatory measures. They began almost the moment the war ended on August 14, 2006.

Digging in for another bought

Hezbollah’s preparations have been focused primarily on the creation of a new line of defense north of the Litani River, resupplying its war-depleted arsenal, acquiring new weapons systems – with an emphasis on air defense, and a systematic campaign of recruitment and training in the Bekaa valley and Iran.

For Hezbollah, the presence of an expanded UNIFIL in the southern border district forced the group to abandon the elaborate system of bunkers and hidden firing positions it so painstakingly constructed between 2000 and 2006. The fortifications in Hezbollah’s former “security pockets” in the wadis and hill tops of the border district served their purpose during last summer’s month-long war and are of no further use, their locations having been compromised and the utility of surprise having been exhausted.

Instead, Hezbollah has been busy consolidating a line of defense just north of the Litani – the northern limit of UNIFIL’s zone of operations. Hezbollah’s military deployment north of the Litani around the village of Rihan was first revealed in February simultaneously by the Christian Science Monitor and the London Telegraph. Since then, there has been much media interest in Hezbollah’s activities in the rugged limestone mountains overlooking the Litani.

The area in question is bordered by Jezzine in the north, the Shia villages of the western Bekaa to the east, the Iqlim al-Touffah heights to the west and the Litani to the south. It is geo-strategically important terrain as it commands the high ground overlooking the coast to the west and the southern Bekaa Valley to the east – both traditional axes of advance for invading armies from the south. Furthermore, the area is sparsely-populated – a mix of Christian, Shia and Druze farms and hamlets – which allows Hezbollah to operate away from prying eyes. Another advantage is that it lies only 10 kilometers from the border with Israel – the closest possible deployment for Hezbollah except for the more populated Nabatieh pocket.

Hezbollah has been based in these hills and valleys since 2000, when Israel withdrew from South Lebanon, but its presence has increased significantly following last year’s war. Hezbollah’s new “security pockets” are guarded by armed and uniformed fighters, who prevent local residents and nosy journalists from entering. There has, however, been little attempt to conceal the existence of these security pockets. At the entrance to one, east of Rihan village, a sign suspended on a chain between two concrete blocks reads “Warning. Access to this area is forbidden. Hezbollah.”

The Lebanese daily An-Nahar reported this week that farmers have been politely asked not to return to areas in Roummaneh, Jabal Safi and Deir Mazaira, between Jezzine and Kfar Houna, as they have been turned into military zones. The guarded entrance to one security pocket is clearly visible from the road between Qotrani and Kfar Houna, a few hundred meters from a Lebanese army checkpoint.

For Hezbollah watchers, the new security pockets are reminiscent of those cordoned off in the border district between 2000 and 2006. Even then, the existence and location of those now-abandoned border security zones was widely known. UNIFIL certainly knew about them and even the Israelis euphemistically dubbed them “nature reserves.” What was unclear, however, was what exactly Hezbollah was up to inside those pockets. It was assumed underground fortifications were being constructed (hinted at by mysterious night-time dynamite explosions in remote wadis), but the true extent and sophistication of the bunker and tunnel complexes only became known after last year’s war.

Similarly, Hezbollah’s new activities inside the security pockets north of the Litani are unclear, but it is reasonable to assume that similar defensive fortifications are being constructed. Certainly, the area is heavily quarried, which could provide effective cover for underground construction work. Furthermore, the number of roads and tracks in the hills around Rihan and the abandoned farmstead at Chbail has increased in the past six months, as has the amount of territory now placed off-limits.

Buying up the Bekaa

The establishment of the new security pockets is being augmented by a program of land purchases mainly undertaken by Ali Tajieddine, a Tyre-based businessman who made his fortune trading in Africa. Tajieddine has extensive construction and property development schemes throughout the country, and he says that his land-buying spree between Jezzine and the Litani is merely to exploit the area’s quarrying and agricultural opportunities.

Much of the territory he is purchasing belongs to Christian and Druze landowners, mainly from the hamlets of Qotrani (Christian), Sraireh (Druze) and Borghoz (Druze). Tajieddine has been snapping up land at between $2-$4 per square meter, often accepting the seller’s initial asking price and paying in cash. On the wind-swept eastern slopes of the Litani between Borghoz and Kawkaba, Tajieddine is building from scratch a brand new village called Ahmadiyeh. Workers there say it will be populated by Shia from Tyre as well as neighboring Shia villages in the western Bekaa. Even a Saudi from Qatif in the kingdom’s Shia Eastern Province is said to have invested heavily in the new village.

Needless to say, the land purchases have alarmed local Christian and Druze politicians who view the plan in starkly sectarian terms. Tajieddine’s property buying, they fear, could result in a “Shia belt” linking the Shia district of Nabatieh and the Iqlim al-Touffah to the Shia villages of the western Bekaa. That would result in severing the Druze of the Chouf from the Druze of Hasbaya and the Christians of Jezzine from the Christians of Marjayoun.

Walid Jumblatt has encouraged Druze landowners to spurn Tajieddine’s advances, and has apparently met with some success as the rate of land purchases in Sraireh seems to have slowed. Still, the poor socio-economic conditions in the area make Tajieddine’s cash offers hard to refuse in the long-term.

The Druze leader has also played a role in trying to obstruct the sale of a mountainside near Kfar Houna to Tajieddine. Jumblatt contacted Carlos Slim – the Mexican tycoon whose forebears hailed from Kfar Houna and whom Fortune Magazine recently claimed had overtaken Bill Gates as the richest man in the world – and asked him to outbid Tajieddine for the mountain.

“I told him the land belongs to the Christians and should stay with the Christians,” Jumblatt told NOW Lebanon. Slim, apparently, was uninterested and declined to intervene.

Laying cables and paving roads

One of Hezbollah’s greatest – if overlooked – achievements during the war was its ability to maintain communication channels between the leadership in Beirut, military commanders and the fighters in the field. Although it has been known for some time that Hezbollah had created its own telephone system independent of the state, the government’s recent discovery of phone cables freshly laid by Hezbollah near Zawtar Sharqieh has turned the illegal network into a hot political issue. A government investigation has revealed that the network extends all the way to downtown Beirut where Hezbollah and its allies are holding their sit-in. Regardless of whether the cables at Zawtar Sharqieh are replacing those damaged during the war or are part of a new network north of the Litani, it is yet further evidence of Hezbollah’s military preparations.

Also raising suspicion is the extensive road building activities occurring in the area by an Iran-funded group called “The Iranian Organization for Sharing in the Building of Lebanon.” The group’s construction work extends throughout South Lebanon and in most cases is a welcome improvement on the current poor state of roads in the South. Still, the original little-used potholed lane that ran from Rihan through Aramta, Qotrani, and onto Meidoun in the western Bekaa is being expanded into a highway, and this has only enhanced suspicions that a Shia belt is being created.

Recent Israeli press reports have sounded the alarm about the highway, speculating that it will be used in a time of war to transport Hezbollah’s heavy artillery rockets from the northern Bekaa to firing positions above the Litani. However, the road building, while certainly improving east-west communications across the mountains, has no significant military value. In the event of another war, Israeli jets will surely crater the road, rendering it impassable – as they did to scores of roads throughout Lebanon last summer. Furthermore, Hezbollah does not require a gleaming highway to transport its war materiel.

The “state within a state” to become a state unto itself?

The qualms of Christians and Druze aside, the motive for Hezbollah’s activities north of the Litani is principally military, not sectarian. An influx of Shias into a previously Christian/Druze area has a tactical value to Hezbollah, as it enhances security surrounding its military preparations.

Earlier this year, the Arabic newspaper Al-Hadath printed a map apparently given by an unnamed British parliamentarian that purported to show a Shia enclave to have been established by Hezbollah with the approval of Iran and Syria.

Hezbollah’s unilateral declaration of independence would be made, Al-Hadath claimed, if a future Lebanese government decided to actively disarm Hezbollah in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1559. Although the story gained considerable traction in Lebanon, a quick glance at the map suggests it is bogus. The canton includes the whole of the Bekaa from north of Hermel to just short of Hasbaya. It then cuts westward through the mountains south of Jezzine, continuing in a narrow corridor hugging the northern bank of the Litani to the coast.

But the Bekaa is not a homogenous Shia area. South of Chtaura, the population is a mix of Christian sects, Sunnis, Druze and Armenians. Even the Shia-dominated Baalbek-Hermel caza includes sizeable Maronite and Sunni communities – all of whom might object to being included in a Hezbollah-controlled enclave. Furthermore, the Shia towns of Bint Jbeil and Khiam and other Shia villages in the border district are not included in the enclave. Would a Hezbollah canton really exclude those bastions of support for the resistance?

Despite the military preparations undertaken by both Hezbollah and Israel, last summer’s war may prove to be the last large-scale conflict limited to the two foes. The persistent dilemma for the Israeli military in its 25-year struggle against Hezbollah is how to tackle and defeat an organization which by its very nature is nebulous, dispersed, independent of, and unaccountable to, the Lebanese state and rooted within the fabric of Lebanese Shia society. The Israelis repeatedly have made the mistake of confronting what is essentially a political problem with military means. Bombing Lebanese infrastructure, assassinating Hezbollah leaders, employing air power, special forces, proxy militias, high-tech surveillance, low-tech outpost defenses – all have been tried since 1990 and none has succeeded in defeating or neutralizing Hezbollah. Israel’s ad hoc approach to last year’s war underlines the imperative of defining a clear set of strategic objectives that makes waging war against Hezbollah worthwhile. A reinforced UNIFIL notwithstanding, Israeli forces could punch through South Lebanon and reach Baalbek within days if it so desired. But then what? There is no physical headquarters or military base that Israel can capture and then justifiably claim victory against Hezbollah. Short of occupying half of Lebanon indefinitely or committing genocide against Lebanon’s Shia population, Hezbollah cannot be defeated by conventional military means.

That is why many analysts are concluding that the next confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah will probably fall within a larger conflict pitting Israel and/or the United States against Syria and/or Iran. The attraction to Israel of striking Syria is to weaken the “axis of resistance” grouping Tehran, Damascus and Hezbollah. Syria is the weak link in the chain, and if Israel is unable to disrupt the “axis” by engaging in peace talks with Damascus, the alternative is to compel the Syrian regime to break with Iran through military force.

Such a scenario is fraught with risk for all sides, with potential region-altering consequences. And despite recent Israeli reassurances that is has no plans (for now) to attack Syria, Hezbollah’s feverish military preparations suggest it is readying for the worst.

Nicholas Blanford is a Beirut-based journalist and author of “Killing Mr Lebanon – The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and its Impact on the Middle East.”